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The  literature  on  clustering  has  highlighted  several  advantages  of  industrial 
agglomerations. Persons and firms benefit from the production and innovation activities of 
neighbouring companies in the same and related industries. Considering such benefits, which 
are viewed as positive externalities, Michael Porter argues that clustering is an important way 
for  firms  fulfilling  their  competitive  advantages  and  for  rising  regional  and  national 
competitiveness. So, it is opportune to ask: what is the appropriate policy for maximizing the 
benefits of CE (cluster externalities)? 
There are basically two possible replies to the above question: on the one hand, the 
traditional optimal-policy perspective recommends providing a subsidy to firms generating 
CE, with the subsidy adjusted for equalizing the strength of the externality; on the other, a 
more pragmatic perspective based on Porter’s policy prescriptions. However, the evidence 
shows a paradox: policy makers use the competitiveness rhetoric inspired in the competitive 
advantages of Porter but, in practice, they go on using the industrial targeting that was also 
criticized by Porter.  
In this paper we deal with this paradox proving that despite the extensive amount of 
externalities is the traditional comparative advantage approach that must guide policy. This 
finding  is  congruent  with  the  Porter’s  policy  prescriptions  and  has  clear  implications  in 
regional policy allowing to support the answer to the following question: Must policy be 
focused  on  creation  of  new  clusters  in  activities  that  have  verified  large  positive  effects 
elsewhere or, conversely, on developing the traditional activities in region, which allegedly 
have  shown  lower  externalities?  But  the  answer  to  this  question  depends  on  our 
comprehension of industrial aggregation processes, which implies the full understanding of 
concepts as clusters and externalities. So, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
After reflecting on the concept of cluster in section 2, section 3 deals with the different types 
of  externalities  present  in  industrial  agglomerations.  Section 4  considers the existence of 
dynamic externalities and relates them with the advantages of backwardness. Section 5 uses a 
model  that  includes  various  types  of  externalities  in  order  to  draw  lessons  for  guiding 
clustering policy. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
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1. Introduction  
It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  industrialization  is  often  accompanied  by  spatial 
agglomeration,  whatever  the  term  used  to  describe  this  grouping  phenomenon:  industrial 
district, spatial agglomeration, industrial concentration, cluster, and so on. Not only regions 
in Southern European countries as Italy, Portugal and France, which have contributed to the 
popularity of the industrial district concept
1, but also regions of so diverse countries as Japan, 
China (Huang et al., 2008; Ruan and Zhang, 2009) and other East Asian economies (Sonobe 
and Otsuka 2006) have all experienced a path of spatial clustering led by SMEs (small and 
medium  enterprises)  during  the  course  of  industrialization.  Some  consider  this  as  a  long 
lasting process at least so long as the popular putting-out system occurred in the U.K prior to 
its Industrial Revolution (Hounshell, 1984)
2.  
Research  in  economic  geography and regional  science has empirically shown that 
agglomeration has been positively associated with productivity at the local geographical level 
both in the US and in Europe (e.g., Ciccone and Hall, 1998; Ciccone, 2002). But in spite of 
the  positive  correlation  between  agglomeration  and  productivity,  only  in  recent  years  the 
rhetoric about regional clusters has been widely adopted in policy circles. This rhetoric can be 
viewed as a mixture of Michael Porter's (1990) point of view about what creates competitive 
advantage for firms and nations, and regional theories on localisation advantages and industrial 
districts. Although we can trace the origin of this rhetoric in the Porter's diamond model
3, 
originally developed to analyse competitive advantages in national terms, but in international 
markets, the Porter’s arguments that ‘competitive advantage is created and sustained through a 
highly localised process’ (Porter, 1990, p. 19) have determined a refocusing of competitive 
advantage from nations to regions. So, in line with the deep discussion that has characterised 
the literature on agglomeration externalities, the competitiveness concept of Porter has also 
come to be used to examine regional competitiveness. However, now attention has mostly 
been directed towards a combination of the Marshallian agglomeration externalities (labour 
pool, collaboration with companies with similar production and collaboration along the value 
                                                
1 Industrial districts in which different factories and workshops crowded together were extensively documented 
in Italy and France in the twentieth century and according to several authors (Piore and Sabel 1984; Porter 1998) 
are still feasible in some regions of Italy. 
2 In the putting-out system, a merchant took market orders and contracted out the production to farmers or skilled 
workers  in  close  proximity,  who  usually  completed  the  work  in  their  homes  or  family  workshops.  Several 
authors consider outsourcing (or subcontracting) as a modern variant of the traditional putting-out system, and 
show that it remains a major feature of industrial production organization in contemporary Japan and Taiwan 
(Sonobe and Otsuka 2006) 
3  Porter's  diamond  model  considers  the  following  as  the  most  important  factors  for  explaining  competitive 
advantage of nations: i) the context for firm strategy and rivalry; ii) demand conditions; iii) factor conditions; and 
iv) related and supporting industries.    3 
chain) and dynamic externalities, rather than the explicit evaluation of the various dimensions 
of Porter's diamond.  
As this change occurs, the point of view that competitive advantage developed from 
characteristics about entire industries in their ‘home region’ evolved into a universal policy 
prescription that offered the promise of sustained growth to any locality or region. Porter-
inspired cluster development gave policy professionals a rationalization for local intervention. 
Policy makers in many countries and regions view this validation as advice to combine cluster 
promotion with any position along the intervention spectrum, from simply recognizing the 
presence of a cluster to the complete promotion of entirely new clusters. Porter’s consultant 
work, alone or in association with his Monitor Company, has also contributed to the wide 
diffusion of cluster strategies in many European countries (Benneworth et al., 2003).  
However the admiration devoted by policy circles is not completely shared by the 
research community. For instance Martin and Sunley (2003, p. 29) interpreted cluster support 
more  as  a  result  of  the  use  of  the  techniques  of  brand  management  than  as  a  genuine 
intellectual  discourse.  Just  as  commercial  organizations  use  a  brand  image  to  seek  to 
differentiate an otherwise ‘ordinary’ product, the cluster label has been cleverly used to sell an 
idea  of  prosperity  that  some  policy-makers  buy  the  world  over.  The  image  of  high 
productivity, prosperity, decentralization and entrepreneurship associated to the cluster brand 
helps to promote the idea that a socially progressive local economy is within the reach of 
policy makers wherever located.  
Besides the cluster brand induced effects, the literature on clustering has contributed to 
highlight  a  set  of  ideas  existing  for  decades,  which  derived  from  standard  business 
agglomeration  theory.  This  has  emphasized  several  advantages  over  alternative modes of 
industrial organization, which are usually viewed as positive externalities. Clusters arise in the 
presence  of  such  externalities,  according  to  which  persons  and  firms  benefit  from  the 
production  and  innovation  activities  of  neighbouring  companies  in  the  same  and  related 
industries. It is also considering the positive externalities that Porter (1998) has argued that 
clustering  is  an  important  way  for  firms  to  fulfil  their  competitive  advantage.  There  is 
abundant  evidence  that  such  externalities  exist  and  lead  to  industry-level  agglomeration 
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). But, what is the appropriate policy for enforcing the clustering 
development and so to encourage such externalities?  
The traditional answer corresponds to what Rodríguez-Clare (2007) named a classical 
optimal-policy  perspective,  i.e.,  to  provide  a  production  subsidy  to  firms  generating 
externalities, with the subsidy adjusted in a way that equalize the strength of the externality.   4 
However, this would be a very demanding solution, as it is extraordinarily difficult, or even 
impossible, to compute the exact power of the externalities. Given these difficulties, it is 
usually accepted that the presence of externalities is per se a good and enough indication to 
advise public intervention and, accordingly, to support the industries that are likely to produce 
positive external economies.  
Another  possible  answer  to  the  above  question  is  based  on  the  Porter’s  policy 
prescriptions
4. But, as Woodward and Guimaraes (2009) point out, there are no known cases 
where regions or countries have explicitly followed these principles instead of the industrial 
targeting associated to the classical optimal-policy perspective. On the contrary, there are 
significant examples where policy makers use the competitiveness rhetoric inspired in the 
competitive advantages but, in practice, they go on using the industrial targeting that was 
criticized by Porter (Pessoa, 2010). In this paper we deal with this paradox arguing that in 
spite of the extensive amount of externalities is the traditional comparative advantages that 
must guide policy and this is congruent with the Porter’s policy prescriptions.  
Choosing the right alternative has clear implications in regional policy. For instance, 
what is the most appropriate policy for a depressed region? To promote the appearance of a 
specific industrial cluster in a region without tradition in such activities or, on the contrary, 
facilitating the development of traditional activities embedded in this region? In other words, 
must policy be focused on creation of new clusters in activities that have proven to have large 
positive effects elsewhere or, conversely, on developing the traditional activities in region, 
which allegedly has shown lower externalities? The answer to these questions depends on our 
comprehension about the effects of industrial aggregation processes, which implies the full 
understanding of concepts as clusters and externalities. So, the remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. After reflecting on the concept of cluster in section 2, section 3 deals 
with  the  different  types  of  externalities  present  in  industrial  agglomerations.  Section  4 
considers  the  existence  of dynamic  externalities and relates  them  with the advantages of 
backwardness. Section 5 uses a model that includes various types of externalities in order to 




                                                
4 These prescriptions are synthesized in Woodward and Guimaraes (2009): i) support the development of all 
clusters, not choose among them; ii) reinforce established and promising clusters rather than attempt to create 
entirely new ones; iii) cluster initiatives are advanced by the private sector, with government as facilitator; iv) 
development should not be guided by top-down policy strategies.   5 
2. Clusters: key characteristics 
Although  the  study  and  discussion  of  industrial  atmosphere  has  a  long  history  in 
academic community discussions, it was the Porter’s competitiveness concept that put it in the 
front  page.  In  fact,  it  was  only  after  Michael  Porter  (1990)  has  examined  the  industrial 
agglomeration from the firm perspective that the theme surpassed the restricted circles of 
economists and geographers. Porter's definition of clusters as “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, 
and  associated  institutions  (e.g.  universities,  standards  agencies,  trade  associations)  in  a 
particular field that compete but also cooperate” (Porter, 2000 p. 15) has become perhaps the most 
widely used. But the Porter’s approach to industrial agglomerations helped not only to impose 
a concept and to justify clusters as targets for public policy, but also it has created a global 
demand  for  consultants  with  policies  to  fit  it.  As  Rosenfeld  (2005:  4)  has  noted,  this 
increasing  demand  of  consultants  can  explain,  almost  partly,  why  industry  clusters  have 
moved from a “relatively obscure idea situated on the periphery of economic development to 
a core practice”. 
Whatever  the  reason,  Michael  Porter's  work  about  ‘clusters’  have  established  the 
standard in the field, and policy-makers of all over the world have used Porter's cluster model 
as a tool for promoting national, regional, and local competitiveness, innovation and growth. 
In  fact,  very  quickly  clusters  called  the  attention  of  many  leaders  in  many  regions,  and 
consequently  the  cluster  related  concepts  were  extended  promptly  to  go  with  local 
circumstances and expectations. However, at least a large part of the popularity of clusters lies 
in its vagueness and definitional elusiveness (Martin and Sunley, 2003). But this imprecision 
in concepts allows to apply the cluster concept to different realities and furthermore prevents 
an accurate policy evaluation. Also the tendency to oversimplify, which is associated to the 
vulgarisation of the definition of “cluster”, permits to find clusters everywhere. In effect, both 
individual researchers and development agencies have identified in recent years clusters so 
diverse as ranging in size from two to thousands companies, enveloping territories as small as 
a  neighbourhood  and  as  large  as  nations,  and  comprising  highly  specialized  members  as 
defined by a four digit industry code and as broadly defined as “high tech”. In today’s policy 
world, clusters are acquiring “the discreet charm of obscure objects of desire” as Martin and 
Sunley (2003) remind, citing Steiner (1998, p. 1).  
In fact there is a lot of confusion around the cluster concept. A key characteristic of 
clusters  is  the  interdependence  among  firms.  This  interdependence  gives  clustered  firms 
certain advantages over isolated firms. But is this interdependence a sufficient condition for   6 
classifying any association of firms (for instance, a network) as a cluster? In our view the 
answer  is  negative.  There  are  other  forms  of  firms  collaboration  characterized  by 
interdependence. But, as Rosenfeld (2005) explains, there are significant differences between 
clusters and the other forms of firms’ associations. 
Both networks and clusters are agglomerations of firms with certain common interests. 
According to Porter (1998, p. 78) “clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected 
companies  and  institutions  in  a  particular  field”.  But,  contrasting  with  networks,  neither 
“membership” in an organisation nor cooperation are required to be “in” a cluster. Free riders, 
just by virtue of location, are able to benefit from non-exclusive external economies that spill 
over  people  and  organizations  localized  under  the  cluster  influence.  This  constitutes  an 
important difference between clusters and other forms of association. According to Rosenfeld 
(2005), the former are informal and inclusive while the latter are formal and exclusive, with 
members  gaining  advantages  over  non-members.  In  clusters,  free  riders  are  not  only 
unavoidable  but  also,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  contribute  to  make  cluster  more 
powerful.  
Another  important  issue  is  the  proximity  between  cluster  elements.  The  benefits  of 
proximity are well-known: Proximity makes greater access to tacit knowledge possible, opens 
opportunities  for  cooperation  and  collaboration  and  gives  the  clustered  firms  power  to 
influence customers, markets, or policies. Proximity also gives higher access to experienced 
labour and allows firms to be more familiarized with competitors’ products and processes and 
to  check  own  innovation  and  targets.  In  spite  of  the  influence  of  recent  innovations,  as 
Internet and overnight delivery, proximity go on being crucial for some production inputs as 
key equipment and components that are knowledge-intensive and/or result from interactive 
research  and  design  (Rosenfeld,  2005).  These  are  issues  where  “soft”  externalities  are 
prominent.  
The importance of proximity in the transfer of tacit knowledge does not depend solely on 
geographical  distance,  as  traditional  explanations  of  the  time  and  cost  advantages  of co-
location  tend  to  conclude.  Although  geographic  co-location  increases  the  probability  of 
interaction does occur, proximity has also a relational dimension. This is important to keep in 
mind  since  the  exchange  of  strategically  important  information  and  knowledge  requires 
mutual trust between the parties. In this sense, proximity is very related with the social capital 
concept highlighted by Putnam (1993) when he analyses the Italian economy. 
So, the proximity that is the key characteristic of a region possesses not only a spatial 
(geographical) dimension, but also a relational dimension. This involves aspects such as trust   7 
and  understanding  (Boschma,  2005).  Although  much  of  the  literature  agrees  that  spatial 
proximity often generates, or at least encourages, the emergence of relational proximity, this 
is not an automatic result from geographic proximity, because trust between the actors is 
basically an effect of how long a particular relationship lasts, how frequent communication 
between the actors is, and whether they engage in repeated collaborations with the same 
actors (Nilsson, 2008). So, despite how close two actors are in terms of geographical location, 
a lack of trust between them can lead to the failure of wished interaction and knowledge 
exchange.  
In the case of the tacit dimension of knowledge, labour mobility between organisations is 
probably one of the most common channels for knowledge transfer between organisations in 
a  region.  Labour  mobility  also  has  a  clear  territorial  dimension  since  the  mobility  of 
individuals between regions, and even more so between countries, is very limited. However, 
the experience of human resources has remained a primary reason of clustering (Krugman, 
1991). Firms depend on a continuous flow of workers skilled with the necessary ability, and 
with  the  knowledge  of  the  business,  which  are  needed  to  both  routine  and  unforeseen 
situations. In every cluster not only a sufficient provision of technicians, sales staff, network 
organization, but also a labour force experienced on the specific milieu in which the cluster 
functions are crucial. This is very hard to get when policy tries to create an entirely new 
cluster. 
On the other hand, the evidence suggests spontaneity in clusters emergence. As shown by 
Rosenfeld (2005: 9), clusters emerge out of a solid foundation that is either embedded in 
existing  companies,  local  expertise,  or  some  special  resources.  The  world’s  best-known 
clusters have a long history and were spontaneous until they reached a sufficient level activity 
that called attention. This suggests some sample bias in analyses of cluster benefits: many 
potential clusters disappear before they constitute case studies. Perhaps this fact can explain 
some controversy about the positive effects of clusters, although it can be risky to conclude, 
as Perry (2010) does, that in practice, there is no strong evidence that businesses that are 
located in a cluster gain an advantage over those that do not. 
Economic history shows that the origins of clusters are diverse and wide-ranging: we find 
clusters  that  result  from  one  or  two  successful  companies  with  employees  with  an 
entrepreneurial vision; or from the expansion of value added chains around very large firms; 
or even from efforts by laid off employees to use their competencies in innovative ways. But, 
although their origin may be varied, spontaneity, relational dimension of proximity, tacit   8 
knowledge, interdependence and some informality are key characteristics of all of the best-
known. All of these characteristics are hardly created or manipulated by policy.  
 
 
3. Agglomeration and static externalities  
There are several theories that highlight, in different ways, the importance of the local 
environment  for  economic  transformation  and  growth.  Some  of  these  can  be  catalogued  as 
belonging to “regional cluster theory”, but a number of basic concepts are common to most of 
other different theoretical perspectives. Many of such perspectives have a past well before 
cluster’s  fashion.  The  Agglomeration  externalities  constitute  the  basis  of  one  of  such 
perspectives.  In  effect  near  a  century  ago  Alfred  Marshall,  in  his  book  Principles  of 
Economics  described  how  companies  got  advantages  as  a  result  of  being  located  in  close 
geographic proximity to each other businesses. Potter and Watts (2011) have grouped these 
externalities in a “trinity of agglomeration economies” (local pool of skilled labour, local 
supplier linkages, and local knowledge spillovers), from wich firms should receive increasing 
returns. 
Table 1 summarizes the recognized types of agglomeration externalities. It shows the 
division  into  localisation  externalities,  urbanisation  externalities,  Jacob's  externalities  and 
related variety benefits, and gives examples where they act positively or negatively.  
Commonly speaking, localization externalities are advantages got by companies from 
being located in regional environments where there are many other businesses. The financial 
industry in the City of London, the textile and footwear manufacturing in northern Italy, the 
ICT industries in Silicon Valley and the Hollywood film industry are only a few of best known 
examples highlighted in literature of industrial agglomerations, which are characterized by 
high externalities. The fundamental reason is that individual companies benefit from the high 
spatial concentration of businesses, but agglomeration can also cause negative effects. The 
external effects (positive or negative) may arise both because of knowledge spillovers or 
pecuniary externalities (see Krugman, 1991). They are created through co-location, but each 
individual company can only influence the conditions to a very small degree.  
There  are  many  different  types  of  localization  externalities,  and  their  nature  also 
depends on which other companies share the regional environment (businesses of the same 
industry, or companies working in other, but still related, sectors), but the best known in 
literature are the following: a) better access to the market for goods and to suppliers, labour   9 
pooling, and easy flow of technology know-how (Marshall, 1920); b) speeding the flow of 
ideas  (Glaeser  and  Gottlieb,  2009)  and  increasing  the  innovation,  which  results  from 
technology linkages among related industries (Scherer 1982; Feldman and Audresch 1999); c) 
transforming into many small investments a large lump-sum investment (Schmitz 1995) and 
so lowering capital entry barriers (Ruan and Zhang, 2009).  
 
Table 1. Positive and negative agglomeration externalities 
Type of externality  Positive  Negative 
Localization:  These  are 
agglomeration  advantages  that 
result  from  a  spatial  concentration 
of companies operating in the same 
industry or conducting similar types 
of  activities.  Companies  in  similar 
industries  benefit  from  co-location 
due  to  the  creation  of  a  regional 
pool of specialised inputs.  
Creation of a regional pool of specialised 
and  experienced  manpower;  exchange of 
knowledge,  and  collaboration  between 
companies along a product's value chain; 
better access to the market for goods and 
to suppliers, and easy flow of technology 
know-how (Marshall, 1920) 
Small firms can achieve economies of scale 
that would otherwise only be accessible to 
large  organisations;  transforming  into 
many  small  investments  a  large  lump-
sum investment (Schmitz 1995) and, so, 
lowering capital entry barriers (Ruan and 
Zhang, 2009)  
 
Lock-in  effects.  Such  lock-ins 
may  arise,  for  example,  as  a 
result  of  a  too  introverted 
aptitude (Grabher, 1993) 
Urbanization:  The  agglomeration 
advantages that arise in large cities as 
a consequence of their rich economic 
environment,  or  simply  because  of 
their size. 
A variety of different actors can share access 
to  advanced  infrastructure,  highly  skilled 
workers or specialised services, which are 
all  to  the  benefit  of  businesses  in  many 
different industries.  
The  higher  cost  of  living  that 
boosts  salaries  (Glaeser  and 
Maré,  2001).  Higher  property 
and  land  prices,  and  pollution 
and congestion from the use of 
infrastructure. 
 
Jacobs:  a  variant  of  urbanisation 
externalities that places the focus on a 
region's  economic  variety  (the 
presence  of  many  different  industries, 
for  example).  Different  industries 
complement  each  other  in  the 
creation of innovations. 
Many  different  industries  in  one  region 
may  benefit  young  companies  in  their 
ability  to  innovate  (Duranton  and  Puga, 
2001),  as  young  companies  can  gain 
inspiration  from  other  industries  for 
solving  their  problems.  Speeding  the 
flow  of  ideas  (Glaeser  and  Gottlieb, 
2009)  and  increasing  the  innovation, 
which  results  from  technology  linkages 
among related industries  (Scherer  1982; 
Feldman and Audresch 1999). 
 
In  cases  of  too  fragmented 
small sectors, there is a risk that 
the  support  functions,  such  as 
specialised  services,  targeted 
infrastructure  initiatives  or 
business  policy,  will  also 
become  too  fragmented  to  be 
effective. 
Related  variety  benefits:  a  mix  of 
Jacobs  and  localisation  externalities. 
If  industries  are  related,  the 
likelihood  of  a  successful  cross-
pollination  of  ideas  increases.  If  a 
region  is  home  to  many  actors  in 
related  industries,  this  can  lead  to 
more ideas being spread between the 
industries than if they were unrelated 
(Frenken et al, 2007).  
Firms  within  the  industries  use  similar 
types  of  knowledge,  or  similar  types  of 
production  technology  (or  both).  For 
example,  companies  in  the  chemicals  and 
pharmaceuticals  sectors  may  largely  use 
workers with the same skills.  
The  prevalent  knowledge  can 
be used routinely and so there 
are  scarce  hypotheses  of 
emerging  new  types  of 
knowledge.  
   10 
Although there is a consensus about the existence of such externalities and that they 
lead to industry-level agglomeration, empirically the agreement is less notorious. On the one 
hand,  some  researchers  regard  externalities  as  impressive  and  abundant  (Rosenthal  and 
Strange,  2004),  on  the  other,  several  authors  are  less  optimistic  about  the  possibility  of 
measuring the effects of different externalities. For example, Feldman (2000) notes that the 
results of research typically vary from negative to positive externalities. The discrepancy has many 
reasons: a) differences in methodological design and the type of selection (De Groot et al, 2008); 
b) companies benefit from some type but not from every type of externalities (Neffke et al, 2008); 
c) the impact of different types of externalities seems to change with the development phase of the 
industry (Potter and Watts, 2011), for example, localisation externalities look like more important 
for mature and well-established industries, while Jacobs’ externalities are more important for young 
industries in dynamic development stages (Henning et al, 2010).  
With  the  exception  of  some  Jacobs’  external  economies,  the  agglomeration 
externalities summarized in table 1 are static in the sense that they affect the total factor 
productivity of firms through an increase in the efficiency of the technologies in use. This 
increase in efficiency usually comes from a reduction of costs caused by concentration, such 
as reduced transportation and transaction costs for intra-organisational exchange and access to 
external  markets.  But  there  is  another  type  of  external  economies that  can influence the 
development and the relative well being of different regions in the long run. These are the 
dynamic externalities, which we deal with in the next section. 
 
 
4. Dynamic externalities: Localised learning and the advantages of backwardness  
It is important to distinguish between static and dynamic externalities (Glaeser et al, 1992). 
Dynamic  externalities  arise  mainly  through  the  relationships  between  people  and 
organisations  that  increase  knowledge  flows  and,  consequently,  enhance  knowledge 
formation,  innovation  and  diffusion.  So,  dynamic  externalities  are  strongly  associated  with 
knowledge spillovers (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003).  
It is  possible to  explain dynamic externalities  as resulting from  processes of localised 
learning (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). This means that learning appears as the key way of 
transmitting knowledge in territorially industrial agglomerations and, consequently, to know 
how  and  under  what  principles  knowledge  can  be  transmitted  is  decisive  for  qualifying 
external economies as dynamic. Particularly in this context, learning processes must consider   11 
the two dimensions of knowledge: tacit and codified (Polanyi, 1967)
5. The key point here is 
that  these  dimensions  are  not  substitutable.  On  the  contrary,  they  are complementary:  in 
principle, the application of any codified knowledge requires a degree of tacit knowledge. In 
fact, the economic useful knowledge always contains a tacit as well as a codified dimension, 
although the proportions between them can vary from one to another situation.  
In regional innovation research the tacit dimension of knowledge is usually emphasized as 
it  allows  explaining  how  firms  can  benefit  from  regional  co-location  (Gertler,  2003). 
Proximity  and  face-to-face  contacts  are  very  important  in  transmitting  tacit  knowledge. 
Where the proximity is high it is likely that the tacit knowledge spills over to neighbours. 
Furthermore, proximity increases the strength of linkages between people and organizations. 
This is also why many process of learning are described as "learning-by-doing" or “learning 
by interacting”.  
The empirical literature reveals that dynamic externalities play a very important role in 
industrial  agglomerations.  Moreover,  given  that  knowledge  spillovers  are  the  main 
mechanism  through  which  the  dynamic  externalities  work,  it  is  probable  that  they  are 
accompanied by international spillovers in open economies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003; Coe 
and Helpman, 1995; Coe et al., 1997). This means that although the economy (national or 
regional) where the knowledge originates is on the point of benefiting more and sooner, other 
economies are likely to benefit from spillovers, too. But the power of international spillovers 
is also associated to the different level of development between economies. 
Indeed,  the  process  of  economic  development  can  be  analysed  by  focussing  on 
changes occurring in the economy’s industrial structure at the same time as its GDP increases. 
This is the driving idea of the structural approach to economic development and is also of the 
perspective  known  as  the  ‘advantages  of  backwardness’,  following  the  leading  work  of 
Abramovitz (1979, 1986). This perspective, also known as the ‘catch-up hypothesis’, in its 
simplest  form  states  an  inverse  association  between  the  initial  productivity  level  of  an 
economy and its productivity growth rates in the long run.  
For  some  authors  (Nelson  and  Phelps,  1966;  Fagerberg,  1987;  Fagerberg  and 
Verspagen, 2002), it is the existence of a technology gap between economies that allows the 
possibility of profiting from advanced technologies without the cost of inventing them. So, 
according to this hypothesis, the technology gap carries a potential for generating growth 
more rapidly in the technologically backward economies than in leader ones, since they can 
                                                
5 The difference is well known. While tacit knowledge is based on practice, which cannot be expressed in words, 
codified knowledge can be easily formulated, for instance, in designs, text, or mathematical formulas.   12 
have access to technologies that have already been employed by the technological leaders, 
and  by  profiting  from  them  they  can  make  a  larger  productivity  jump.  Although  the 
Abramovitz’s (1986) analysis goes beyond this simplest version, we can take the technology 
gap perspective as a basis to show how knowledge spillovers can occur in international (and 
interregional) context, and to introduce them in the model of the next section.  
The technology gap perspective bases the tendency of economies to converge on the 
existence of a technology differential (Nelson and Phelps, 1966) between advanced and less 
developed  economies  or  more  specifically  in  the  capacity  of  laggard  economies  to  use 
knowledge  developed  abroad  through  imitation  (Fagerberg,  1987).  But,  although  the 
Fagerberg’s  (1987,  1988)  perspective  provides  a  source  of  growth  and  convergence,  the 
advantages of backwardness are not limited to the positive effects of international diffusion of 
knowledge. They must be more accurately characterized as the combined effect of several 
economic mechanisms associated to the structural transformation of a backward economy 
occurred as economic development proceeds (see Abramovitz and David, 1995).  
The  ‘advantages  of  backwardness’  theory  was  initially  developed  for  a  national 
situation, inserted in an international background characterized by a “leader” country and 
other  “follower”  countries,  but  we  can  adapt  it  to  a  regional  context  with  few  small 
adjustments.  Indeed,  if  a laggard region is not completely  closed  it can enjoy from four 
advantages in growth potential, according to Abramovitz and David (1995). First, differently 
from a leader region, which already uses state-of-the-art technology, in a laggard one the 
tangible capital is likely to be technologically obsolete and so, when the latter expands or 
replace  its  capital  stock  the  new  equipment  can  embody  up-to-date  technology.  So,  the 
laggard can realize larger improvements in the average efficiency of its productive facilities 
than  are  available  to  the  leader.  A  similar  rationale  applies  to  potential  advances  in 
disembodied technology, and to the non-technological innovations (new forms of industrial 
organization and managerial practices, routines of purchasing, production and merchandising, 
etc.), of a laggard region. Knowledge spillovers play here an important role.  
Also,  because  laggard  regions  have  low  levels  of  capital  per  worker,  such 
circumstance, in particular considering the possibility to modernize capital stock, tends to 
increase marginal returns to capital and, so, to promote higher rates of capital accumulation. 
Additionally, because laggard regions often maintain relatively large numbers of redundant 
workers in farming and petty trade, with very low levels of productivity, the productivity 
growth  can  occur  by  shifting  labour  from  agricultural  to  industrial  jobs  and  from  self-
employment and family shops to business firms, even taking into account the cost of the   13 
additional  capital  that  might  be  necessary  to  maintain  productivity  levels  in  the  new 
occupations.  
Finally, the relatively rapid growth resulting from the first three sources goes towards 
fast growth in aggregate regional output and, consequently, in the scale of markets. This 
promotes  the  technical  progress,  especially  the  one  that  is  dependent  on  larger-scale 
production. This sort of technical progress can disguise the lack of technological efforts to 
create new knowledge through R&D activity, inside boundaries of laggard regions. This is 
also a fertile soil for knowledge spillovers to play an important role. 
To sum up, if a poor region trades with a rich economy, the economic growth in the 
poor one can increase by effect of the production factors and technology used but also by the 
occurrence of static and dynamic externalities, the latter operating through two basic ways: 
localized learning (e.g., learning by doing, learning by interacting) and as a result of the 
advantages  of  backwardness,  which  increase  the  propensity  for  profiting  from  positive 
externalities including the knowledge spillovers.  
 
 
5. The model 
This  section  presents  a  model  that  demonstrates  the  action  of  different  types  of 
externalities and allows determining the equilibrium conditions in a poor open region. The 
model is based on the following assumptions: 
1) There are two regions, R (rich) and P (poor), indexed by j, one factor of production, L 
(labour), in fixed supply, and two sectors each one producing only one good i, with i = 1, 2.  
2) Both goods, can display SE (static externalities), not necessarily in the same degree. This 
captures  the  idea that SE are not an  automatic result of the type of sector (advanced or 
backward) but depend on the characteristics of the regional milieu. This permits to focus 
attention on modes of production as the crucial sources of externalities, instead of on the 
characteristics  of  goods  or  sectors.  Accordingly,  each  good  can  be  produced  using  two 
possible MoP (modes of production), which we call Cl and Is, “clustering” and “isolation”, 
respectively. These MoP differ in the extent to which they generate externalities: Only the Cl 
mode produces externalities.  
3) There may be exogenous productivity differences across R and P regions in the production 
of  good  i  (controlled  by  the  productivity  parameter  ij y ).  This  exogenous  productivity 
parameter yij is independent of the mode of production used and, consequently independent of 
SE. The Is mode of production has labour productivity yij. That is, if there are no aggregate   14 
externalities, good i is produced with constant returns to scale: a unit of labour produces  ij y . 
So,  ij ijIs y y = . 
4) Although good i is produced with constant returns to scale at the firm level, the use of the 
Cl mode of production makes appear static externalities, and consequently an increase in the 
labour productivity, which, in steady state, equals to:  
With the term  i λ >1 representing the maximum benefit of clustering in sector i. It captures the 
static, local, external economies (for short, SE). 
5)  As  in  similar  models,  we  suppose  that  preferences  satisfy  the  Inada  conditions; 
consequently any equilibrium must have positive production of both goods.  
6) For convenience goods are ordered in such a way that  P R P R y y y y 1 1 2 2 / / ≥ , so that R has a 
natural comparative advantage in good 2. To simplify the exposition, the possibility that the 
static benefits of clustering are decreasing in i is excluded. This means that  i iP iR y y λ ) / (  is 
higher for good 1 than for good 2. That is, we exclude the possibility that the sector in which 
R has a Ricardian comparative advantage has much lower capacity of generating externalities.  
7) Because we assume that P is “open” and “small,” the international prices can be derived 
from the equilibrium of R region, as if the latter was a single economy. If we choose labour in 
R as the numeraire, international prices will be simply given by the requirements of labour 









1 * = , if 
there is a static externality. The latter shows that clustering causes a lower international price 
of good i, eroding in this way the benefits of the Cl MoP. 
Theoretically,  R  economy  can  opt  either  by  allocating  all  labour  to  the  Cl  MoP 
producing each good with productivity ( i iR y λ ) higher than the one associated with the Is 
mode  of  production ( iR y ) or by  placing all labour on  the  Is  mode of production
6. If we 
assume, in order to simplify the analysis, that there are clusters in all sectors of R, equilibrium 





1 * = .  
Focusing on P, several situations can occur. Table 2 shows these situations.  
 
                                                
6 Also in this case, productivity will be higher than with the Cl MoP, which would be zero since no labour is 
allocated to the Cl MoP.  
 
i ij ijCl y y λ =   (1)   15 
Table 2. Possible equilibria with static externalities in P (poor region) 
  Specialization of P  Income gap 
No comparative advantages and  λ λ = i  
  •  P specializes in a sector with a 
cluster (it could be either good 
1 or good 2) 







  •  No trade and no clusters in P  1 > λ  
Comparative advantages and  2 1 λ λ ≠  
  •  Complete specialization in sector 
1 with Cl MoP 
P R y y 1 1 /  
  •  P specializes completely in sector 








  •  P specializes completely in sector 
2. This would only happens if 
good 2 was produced with Cl 












( ) P R y y 1 1 1 / λ <  
* Where w denotes the wage in P. 
 
Table  2  summarizes  possible  equilibria  in  a  (small)  poor  region  where  static 
externalities are present. It embodies two situations. First, the inexistence of comparative 
advantages together with equal externality intensity across sectors. In this case, we face two 
possible equilibria: one equilibrium where P specializes in a sector with a cluster from which 
results no income gap between R and P; the other is an isolation situation, no clusters and no 
trade in the P economy. Second, if we assume different comparative advantages and different 
externality intensity there are three possible equilibria in P. One equilibrium entails complete 
specialization in the sector with the highest relative productivity (i.e., sector 1) and clustering 
in this sector. Another equilibrium entails complete specialization in this same good, but 
without a cluster. Finally, there is another equilibrium with complete specialization in sector 
2. This is an equilibrium if, and only if, nobody wants to deviate and produce good 1 with the 
Is MoP. What are the conditions needed to this equilibrium?  
In order to derive conditions for this equilibrium, consider that if P specializes in 
sector 2 with a cluster, then it must be that the unit cost of good 2 produced in P without a 
cluster would be equal to the international price of good 2. That is: 
Where w denotes the wage in P. 
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= . For complete specialization in good 2 with a cluster to be an equilibrium, it 
is necessary that its unit cost be higher than the international price of good 1, 
*
1 p , or:  
 
And, rearranging condition (3), we have: 
 
Condition (4) shows that for complete specialization in good 2 with the Cl MoP to be 
an equilibrium it is necessary that comparative advantage in good 1 relatively to good 2 be 
weaker than the benefits of the externality in production of good 1. 
As  is  visible  from  table  2,  the  equilibrium  with  specialization  in  good  2  has  an 
intermediate  level of income, while the highest income level is associated to the good 1 
produced with the Cl MoP, where P has a comparative advantage. Of course, the equilibrium 
with specialization in a sector without clustering generates the lowest income level. It is also 
apparent in table 2 that  2 λ  does not affect income when P specializes in good 2 with Cl MoP. 
The reason for this no interference is that the higher productivity generated by the stronger 
static externalities in sector 2 is exactly compensated by a lower international price.  
So we can take a first conclusion: the power of static externalities is not significant for 
the choice among equilibria. If policy tries to maximize welfare, it must choose among the 
possible equilibria one with clustering, but the choice must not be exclusively guided by the 
greatness of external economies. The target would be the sector with highest externalities if, 
and only if, the strongest comparative advantage corresponds to this sector. Otherwise, policy 
makers must opt by the sector with the strongest comparative advantage, irrespective of the 
dimension of positive externalities. But, this conclusion was made only with base on the 
presence of static externalities. Can the dynamic externalities and international spillovers alter 
these results? To answer this question we need to introduce some additional assumptions. The 
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To take in account the effects of dynamic externalities, we introduce an additional 
productivity variable, Zijt, which increases with time, t, thanks to dynamics externalities. Just 
as with  ij y , Zijt is independent of the MoP used, but dynamic externalities are produced only 
with  the  Cl  and  their  amount  depends  on  the  type  of  economy.  Accordingly,  labour 
productivity across sectors is now also multiplied by this variable, Zijt.  
So, if there is no trade between regions, production with the Is MoP generates no 
dynamic externalities whatever the sector, whereas production with Cl generates external but 
sector-specific dynamic economies, which lead to increasing productivity in manufacturing. 







, where a dot above the variable means the time derivative of the same variable). 
However, if we consider interregional trade, poor region may be able to benefit also 
from the advantages of backwardness as exposed in the previous section. In this case, in 
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,  if  we  define  z ˆ   as 
iRt iPt Z Z / ).  
In  other  words,  if  there  is  interregional  trade,  productivity  increases  caused  by 
dynamic externalities in one economy eventually diffuse to the other economy even if there is 
not a cluster there. Thus, in this model, clusters are important to generate knowledge but 
benefiting from knowledge (knowledge spillovers) is independent of the MoP. Profiting from 
these benefits only depend on the technology gap between P and R. Suppose for concreteness 
that R has a cluster in sector i but the P does not. Then it is assumed that the rate of growth of 
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Focusing on the right hand side of equation (6), the first term captures learning by 
doing,  whereas  the  second  term  captures  the  spillovers  coming  from  the  advantages  of 
backwardness.    18 
Given these assumptions governing dynamic externalities and catching up, if P does 
not have a cluster in sector i, its labour productivity in steady state would be  iRt iP iPt iP Z z y Z y ˆ = , 
at time t. In contrast, the R’s productivity in sector i, where we are assuming a cluster exists, 
would be  iRt i iR Z y λ . Thus, the ratio of productivities in R versus P in sector i under these 
circumstances would be ( ) ( ) z y y j iP iR ˆ / 1 / λ . The first term captures the comparative advantage 
(i.e., pure Ricardian productivity differences) whereas the second and third terms capture the 
impact of the static and dynamic benefits of clustering, respectively. 
To draw lessons from this model we have to analyse the steady state equilibrium in P, 
considered as a small open economy (region). Since P is a small region, prices are derived 
from the equilibrium in R as if this was an isolated economy. Assuming for simplicity that the 
R  has  clusters  in  all  sectors, the steady  state equilibrium in R has  productivity  given  by 
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Considering the poor region, several situations can occur. Table 3 summarizes these possible 
situations where both static and dynamic externalities are present. 
 
Table 3. Possible equilibria in a Poor region with dynamic externalities 
  Specialization  Income gap 
Without comparative advantages and with  1 > = λ λi  
  •  P specializes in a sector with a cluster   No income gap 
  •  P has no clusters, there is no trade, and 
iRt iPt Z z Z ˆ =  
Income gap is given by 
1 ) ˆ / ( > z λ . 
With comparative advantages and with  2 1 λ λ ≠  
  •  P is specialized in good 1 with a cluster 
  
P R y y 1 1 /  
  •  P is specialized in good 1 with no cluster  
  ( )( ) P R y y z 1 1 1 / ˆ / λ  
  •  P is specialized in good 2 with a cluster  <( )( ) P R y y z 1 1 1 / ˆ / λ  
 
Imagine first that there are no comparative advantages, i.e.,  1 = ij y  for all i, j and also 
that  1 > = λ λi  for i=1, 2. In this case two equilibria are possible. First, there is an equilibrium 
where P specializes in a sector with a cluster (in which case there would be no income gap). 
Second, an equilibrium where P has no clusters, there is no trade, and  iRt iPt Z z Z ˆ =  for all i, t.   19 
Thus, in the Is MoP equilibrium the income gap is given by  1 ) ˆ / ( > z λ . The term λ  captures 
the benefits of static externalities, while  z ˆ / 1  captures the benefits of dynamic externalities 
(although restricted by the advantages of backwardness). If the P region moves from the 
isolated  MoP  to  an  equilibrium  with  a  cluster  in  sector  i,  then  productivity  would  jump 
instantaneously thanks to the static externalities, and there would also be a dynamic effect, 
reflected in a temporary increase in the growth rate of  iPt Z  above x. Clearly, in this case,  iPt Z  
would eventually converge to  iRt Z  and the income gap would disappear.  
With comparative advantages and differences in the intensity of static externalities 
across sectors (i.e.,  2 1 λ λ ≠ ), the set of equilibria is analogous to the set of equilibria derived 
in the model without dynamic externalities: a) there is an equilibrium where P is specialized 
in good 1 with a cluster and the income gap corresponds to the ratio between exogenous 
productivity in the production of good 1 ( P R y y 1 1 / ); b) another equilibrium where the P is 
specialized  in  good  1  with  no  cluster,  in  this  case  the  income  gap  is  ( )( ) P R y y z 1 1 1 / ˆ / λ ; 
accordingly, both R and P grow at the same rate, so there is no convergence. Convergence 
would occur if P managed to develop clusters, so that it too could generate both static and 
dynamic externalities. c) and finally, there is another equilibrium where P is specialized in 
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That is, if condition (8) is satisfied: the ratio of comparative advantages is less than the 
combined effect of externalities. 
To summarize, the results obtained with the static externalities remain valid when we 
move to a more realistic setting with dynamic externalities including the external economies 
derived from the “advantages of backwardness”. Regions with no clusters suffer from the lack 
of both static and dynamic externalities. There are multiple equilibria, and the equilibrium 
with the highest welfare in a poor region is the one where there is clustering in the sector with 
the  strongest comparative  advantage. Policy should focus  on promoting clustering in this 
sector and avoid price distortions.  
There are important implications of  these  results regarding the income gap of the 
different equilibria. As expected, if the government could choose the equilibrium, it would 
always  choose  equilibrium  with  clustering,  but  it  would  also  choose  equilibrium  with   20 
specialization  in  the  sector  with  the  strongest  comparative  advantage;  the  power  of 




This  paper  revolved  around  a  paradox:  why  so  many  policy  makers  use  the 
competitiveness rhetoric inspired in the competitive advantages of Porter but, in practice, go 
on using the industrial targeting that is opposed to Porter’s arguments? The answer to this 
question is closely associated to the policy makers’ faith on the superiority of clusters over the 
isolation MoP, given the expected association between positive externalities and clusters. 
However, this faith has some weaknesses: our literature review shows that both the cluster 
concept  is  usually  poorly  defined  and  very  often  some  cluster  characteristics,  which  are 
difficult  to  be  manipulated  by  policy,  are  overlooked  (spontaneity,  informality,  tacit 
knowledge, etc.). The vagueness in the definition of cluster concept enforced by the appealing 
of the “cluster brand” drives to an exaggerated voluntarism in cluster policy and to the use of 
the traditional industrial policy targeting externality friendly activities.  
Also the association between positive externalities and clusters is overemphasized. 
Not  only  because  usually  only  positive  externalities  are  considered  but  also,  and  more 
importantly, given the difficulty in computing the dimension of the externalities usually they 
are  assumed  instead  of  computed.  However,  in  spite  of  this  difficulty,  policy  acts  as  if 
externalities  were  the  decisive  factor  in  guiding  regional  cluster  policy,  using  external 
economies as a justification to promote activities that have shown externalities elsewhere 
independently of the regional context. But, in this context a question is imperative: Should 
policy promote the creation of new clusters in activities that have verified large positive 
effects elsewhere or, conversely, be focused on developing the traditional activities embedded 
in the region, which allegedly have shown lower externalities?  
In order to answer the above question, our paper has made an analysis of possible 
static and dynamic externalities and includes them in a model that allows for trade with other 
regions. Often externalities are associated to more advanced sectors and consequently policy 
should target these sectors, to benefit from stronger externalities. In contrast, since we are 
dealing  with  externalities  that  arise  from  the  clustering  process,  and  this  is  assumed  as 
territorially grounded, our model considers externalities as not associated to the characteristics 
of the sector but, on the contrary, originated from the way a good is produced.    21 
The  model  presented  here  shows  that  it  is  the  traditional  comparative  advantage 
approach that must go on guiding policy. The main policy implication of this finding is that 
the strength of positive externalities does not matter in choosing which clusters to promote. 
This has an additional implication: governments should not try to create entirely new clusters, 
as already stated by Porter.  
To sum up, when a region has a comparative advantage in producing a good or in a 
sector, promoting an entirely new cluster in other sector may be inferior to non-intervention, 
and is always dominated by the promotion of a cluster in sectors where the region is already 
showing comparative advantage. Additionally, our model shows that it is not the case that 
governments should support clustering in industries with stronger externalities, since such 
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